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Earlier in this century, George Orwell, in his novel, 1984,
offered a vision of the world where the logical might be illogical,
right could be wrong, and 2 plus 2 might equal 5. Now that we are
beyond 1984 and at the end of the century, humanity faces a
future where a millennium of norms established by custom and
law may be altered by the implementation of new technologies. As 
in the Orwellian world of 1984, what seems to be may not be, and
what was intended for good could become bad.
In this monograph, Air Force Colonel Charles Dunlap starts
from the traditional American notion that technology might offer
a way to decrease the horror and suffering of warfare. He points
out that historically this assumption is flawed in that past
technological advances, from gunpowder weapons to bombers,
have only made warfare more—not less—bloody. With a
relentless logic, Colonel Dunlap takes to task those who say that
the Revolution in Military Affairs has the potential to make war
less bloody.
He covers the technological landscape from precision-guided
munitions and Information Warfare to the use of space for
military operations to raise issues that could pose difficult
ethical, legal and moral problems for statesmen and soldiers.
Some of these conundrums are so confounding that the author
could claim that in all humility his only purpose was to raise these 
issues to prompt debate. But Colonel Dunlap takes the next step
to outline several broad thematic avenues that may help us all
address the difficult problems that lie ahead. The issues are
important and what follows in this monograph invites discourse.
I am sure Colonel Dunlap joins me in welcoming you to that
discussion. Let me urge you to indulge yourself in Technology and 
the 21st Century Battlefield.
LARRY M. WORTZEL
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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TECHNOLOGY AND THE 21ST CENTURY
 BATTLEFIELD: RECOMPLICATING MORAL
 LIFE FOR THE STATESMAN AND
THE SOLDIER
So by the benefit of this light of reason, they have found out
Artillery, by which warres come to a quicker ends than
heretofore, and the great expence of bloud is avoyed; for the
numbers slain now, since the invention of Artillery, are much
lesse than before, when the sword was the executioner.
John Donne, 1621
Introduction.
To a French Foreign Legionnaire reeling under
murderous Viet Minh bombardments at the siege of Dien
Bien Phu, the notion that the advent of artillery would
diminish the carnage of war would seem to be the
cruelest—and most preposterous of ironies.1 Yet not
uncommonly the introduction of new military technology is
accompanied by enthusiastic predictions that the savagery
of war will somehow be mitigated. All too often, however,
these promises remain unfulfilled. Consider, for example,
the widely held 17th century belief that the invention of
gunpowder made war “less horrible.”2 
Such is the faith in scientific progress. In truth,
technological advances bear great responsibility for the
exponential growth in the sheer destructiveness of war.3
Furthermore, as the grim statistics of modern conflicts
amply demonstrate,4 much of that destructiveness falls not
just upon belligerent armies and their weaponry, but
increasingly upon noncombatants and their property.
Today we are once again seeing renewed optimism that
technology might yet provide relief from the nightmare of
war. Recent scientific developments raise hopes that 21st
1
century warfare—if not avoided altogether—might
nevertheless be waged in a more humane manner. Much of
this optimism is traceable to the Gulf War where the
application of high technology seemed to minimize allied
and Iraqi casualties alike. Key to this new perception of war
were the widely televised images of precision-guided
munitions (PGMs).5 The hopes those pictures evoked are
exemplified by the comments of authors George and
Meredith Friedman in their book, The Future of War:6
The accuracy of PGM[s] promises to give us a very different age;
perhaps a more humane one. It is odd to speak favorably about
the moral character of a weapon, but the image of a Tomahawk
missile slamming precisely into its target when contrasted with
the strategic bombardments of World War II does in fact contain 
a deep moral message and meaning. War may well be a
ubiquitous part of the human condition, but war’s permanence
does not necessarily mean that the slaughters of the twentieth
century are permanent.7
To many, PGMs are not the only means of fulfilling the
dream of more humane war. The advocates of “information
operations”8 and cyberwar9 contend that 21st century
conflicts can be fought virtually bloodlessly in cyberspace.
In a cyberwar scenario depicted in a 1995 Time magazine
article, a United States Army officer conjured up a future
crisis where a technician ensconced at a computer terminal
in the United States could derail a distant aggressor
“without firing a shot” simply by manipulating computer
and communications systems.10 Likewise, the proponents of 
a growing plethora of “nonlethal”11 technologies argue that
a range of adversaries can be engaged without deadly effect.
Collectively, most experts believe these innovations
reflect an ongoing “revolution in military affairs” (RMA).
The RMA seeks to produce radically more effective—and, as
the Friedmans indicate, more humane—militaries by
profoundly altering their doctrine, organization, and
weaponry through the widespread application of emerging
microchip-based technologies, especially advanced
computer and communications systems.12 Many observers
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believe that the RMA will give the United States a virtually
insurmountable military advantage for the foreseeable
future.13 
The impetus to seek technological solutions to virtually
every human dilemma—even the costly viciousness of
war—is quintessentially American.14 “Yankee ingenuity”
has long sought to substitute machines for manpower.15
Unsurprisingly, therefore, the United States has
enthusiastically embraced the RMA; technology has rapidly 
become the cornerstone of America’s military planning. The
former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff declared that
his 1996 directive, Joint Vision (JV) 2010,16 furnishes “an
operationally based template”17 as to “how America’s armed 
forces will channel the vitality and innovation of our people
and leverage technological opportunities to achieve new
levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting.”18
All of this would seem to bode well for those concerned
with the ethical conduct of war. But are new technologies
unqualified virtues? In Why Things Bite Back: Technology
and the Revenge of Unintended Consequences, author
Edward Tenner reminds us that technological “advances”
have the nasty habit of surprising us with unexpected
adverse qualities once their full import is experienced.19
Well-intentioned efforts can paradoxically create problems
worse than the ones a specific invention was meant to solve.
Even generally favorable scientific developments
frequently manifest “revenge effects” which at best
“recomplicate” a particular task or situation.
This monograph seeks to examine the moral
conundrums that 21st century statesmen and soldiers may
face by identifying some of the ethical issues that are
generated or, as Tenner might put it, “recomplicated” by
technological advances. Doing so will necessarily involve
assessing the impact of high-tech war on the existing law of
armed conflict (LOAC).20 The monograph contends that
there is a direct relation between ethics and LOAC. As
Geoffrey Best insists, “[I]t must never be forgotten that the
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law of war, wherever it began at all, began mainly as a
matter of religion and ethics . . . It began in ethics and it has
kept one foot in ethics ever since.”21 As a result, this
monograph will try to show where international law, which
should reflect at least minimum standards of ethics and
morality, needs reexamination because of the new
technologies of war.
Neither ethics nor law, however, can answer all the
questions that may arise on 21st century battlefields. Very
often policy addresses the many gray areas that ethics and
law do not necessarily enlighten—let alone resolve. Policy is 
critical because even where a particular course of action is
technically moral and legal, there remains the important
question of perceptions. Perceptions can materially affect
the public support that military operations conducted by
democracies require. Professors W. Michael Reisman and
Chris T. Antoniou explain:
In modern popular democracies, even a limited armed conflict
requires a substantial base of public support. That support can
erode or even reverse itself rapidly, no matter how worthy the
political objective, if people believe that the war is being
conducted in an unfair, inhumane, or iniquitous way.22
In developing policy for 21st century statesmen and
soldiers, leaders must deal with two related aspects of
post-Vietnam and post-Gulf War America. The first is the
growing aversion in both the electorate and in the
uniformed ranks toward incurring virtually any friendly
casualties in many military operations.23 The second, which
William Boyne points out “is unusual in history,”24 requires
wars to be won with “a minimum number of casualties
inflicted on the enemy.”25 The rapid end to the Gulf War
following televised pictures of the so-called “Highway of
Death” illustrates the new ethical and political perceptions
that can influence policymakers.
Of course, this monograph does not purport to address
every, or even most, of the challenges of ethics, law, and
policy produced by high-technology war. Moreover, even
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where the issues that could recomplicate moral life for 21st
century statesmen and soldiers are described, solutions are
seldom supplied. Rather, if this essay succeeds, it will pose
questions that, in turn, may suggest areas worthy of further
study. With this in mind, let us return to PGMs, perhaps the 




As already indicated, PGMs26 are considered by many as
a key to more humane warfare. JV 2010 touts “precision
engagement” as a means to “lessen risk to [United States]
forces, and [to] minimize collateral damage.”27 PGMs aim to
diminish the horror of war not only because they reduce
collateral damage, but also because their accuracy
decreases the number of attackers required to go in harm’s
way to strike a given target.28 PGMs fulfill many traditional
legal and moral norms by providing a greatly enhanced
capability to limit the application of force to belligerent
militaries and those implements of war whose destruction is 
mandated by military necessity.29 In short, unlike other
high-tech armaments (e.g., nuclear weapons) that provide
military advantages but political liabilities, PGMs uniquely 
seem to offer both military efficiency and an unparalleled
opportunity to seize the moral high ground so conducive to
maintaining the necessary public support for military
operations.
What then might be the recomplicating effects of their
use? One of these is occasioned by the unpredictability of the 
enemy response. Among other things, we cannot expect
future adversaries to be “grateful” that the United States
used “humane” PGMs against them. The February 1997
issue of Air Force Magazine reports a startling illustration
of how one potential opponent might react:
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Many Russian military theorists believe nuclear weapons
provide the best answer to the challenge posed by
conventionally armed precision guided munitions, which have
become such an important part of Western military strategies.
Russian generals fear that, in a general war, Western nations
could employ such “smart munitions:” to degrade Russian
strategic forces, without ever having to go nuclear themselves.
Consequently, said General Volkov, Russia “should enjoy the
right to consider the first [enemy] use of precision weapons as
the beginning of unrestricted nuclear war against it.” 30
While the risk of nuclear holocaust might be an extreme
example of an unintended consequence of PGM use, there
are plenty of more conventional results of great concern. For 
example, it has been received wisdom since the Gulf War
that Iraq’s firing of Kuwaiti oil fields was a monstrous
environmental crime.31 Yet the fact remains, Professor
Michael Schmitt acknowledges, that “[I]t could be argued
that the fires were intended to take advantage of
‘weaknesses’ in high-tech Coalition weapons. . . . [S]moke
can foil guided munitions. Consider the difficulty, for
example, of using an electro-optical guided weapon on a
smoke-covered target.”32 As a matter of fact, the fires’ smoke 
did degrade the effectiveness of PGMs as well as coalition
intelligence-gathering satellites.33 Authors Michael R.
Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor argue that the
Iraqis torched the Kuwaiti oil fields to “erase the American’s 
high-tech advantage.”34 Indeed, the Iraqis were able to
launch one of their few offensive actions when an armored
formation emerged from the smoke of the burning Burqan
oil fields and struck U.S. Marines early in the ground war.35 
As the Iraqi actions suggest, the use of PGMs might well
drive adversaries—especially in less-developed nations—to
employ pernicious methodologies to counteract them. It is
possible, therefore, that PGM use in certain instances may
render the war more, not less, destructive. If a belligerent is
attacked with high-tech systems against which it lacks the
ability to resist or respond in kind, does it not have the right
to respond with whatever resources it has available?36 Just
because a country has the resources to develop and deploy
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high-tech weaponry does not ipso facto endow it with moral
superiority over economically inferior opponents. Moreover, 
sheer destructiveness does not make a specific method of
warfare necessarily illegal so long as the requisites of the
law of armed conflict are observed.
But it is also evident that when accepted methods of
defense against bombardment, such as hardening and
battlefield dispersal, are circumvented, at least to some
extent, by the deadly accuracy of PGMs, frustrated
defenders may resort to conduct clearly in violation of
international norms. One such behavior may have been
inspired by an unintended consequence of the Gulf War use
of PGMs to destroy the Al Firdos bunker in Baghdad.
Unbeknownst to coalition targeteers, that command and
control facility was also being used as a shelter by the
families of high Iraqi officials. The broadcast of pictures of
bodies being pulled from the wreckage caused U.S.
leaders—concerned about adverse public reaction to the
noncombatant deaths—to virtually end further attacks on
the Iraqi capital.37 Though the decision to forego strikes on
Baghdad had little effect on the outcome of the war, the
precedent is important in the context of Tenner’s
“recomplicating” effect thesis. The U.S. response to the
unexpected results of the Al Firdos bombing could suggest
to some opponents a reliable (albeit unconscionable) method 
of defending against PGM attacks: cover the target with
noncombatants.38
Such brute behavior creates complications for
high-minded U.S. forces. As JV 2010 asserts, “high ethical
standards” are central to the American military ethos.39
This fact, however, makes them vulnerable to tactics that
aim to manipulate their innate respect for human life. For
example, using human shield tactics enabled the Serbs to
discourage PGM strikes by U.S. and other NATO planes by
the simple expedient of chaining captured U.N. troops to
potential targets.40 Other nations can be similarly affected
by the exploitation of noncombatants. During the war in
Chechyna, for example, insurgents offset their techno-
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logical inferiority by threatening civilian hostages to force
the Russians to meet various demands.41
Several potential U.S. adversaries appear prepared to
use noncombatants to blunt the power of high-tech
weaponry. Libya threatened to surround the reported site of 
an underground chemical plant with “millions of Muslims”
in order to ward off attacks.42 Most recently, when Western
military action seemed imminent, Saddam Hussein
inundated his palaces and other buildings with
noncombatant civilians (some of whom may have genuinely
volunteered) in order to discourage PGM attacks by
Western forces sensitive to the effect on their publics of
civilian deaths, regardless of the circumstances.43 
All of this suggests that PGMs are no panacea. The
expectations of decisionmakers that their employment will
reduce the dangers to noncombatants may be frustrated;
indeed, noncombatants could—paradoxically—be placed at
greater risk by PGM use in some instances. In truth, the
inclination of unscrupulous foes who are determined
counter technologically superior U.S. forces to revive the
age-old strategy of human shields may herald a new era of
barbarism in warfare. In commenting on the actions of
Somali warlords who used human shields, James F.
Dunnigan ominously warns that “[i]f the opponents are
bloody-minded enough, they will always exploit the
humanitarian attitudes of their adversaries.”44
Along these lines, technology itself may provide another
recomplicating effect: In order to avoid the effects of PGMs,
new communications technology—which JV 2010 says is
already available—will allow an unprecedented level of
dispersal of military forces. Dispersal is a way to reduce
PGM efficiency—and one that experts assert is militarily
imperative for those wishing to confront an information-
superior opponent like the United States.45 Dispersal
presents a number of recomplications. Among other things,
adversaries can employ inexpensive communications
devices to so disperse their forces (e.g., create “virtual”
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command posts rather than the fixed nodes which optimize
PGM efficiency) that the United States will be forced to use
costly46—and limited—stocks of PGMs against small
targets, many of which will be individually expendable. As
yet another form of the “human-shield” tactic, an enemy can
further complicate targeting solutions by intentionally
dispersing into civilian areas. 
Another way of obviating the effects of PGMs is to move
into complex terrain, especially jungles, forests and urban
areas. Laser and electro-optically guided munitions will not
track targets through foliage. In urban areas, even the
extreme accuracy of PGMs may not be adequate to prevent
civilian casualties.Even the most advanced PGMs will
likely cause unintended noncombatant casualties when
used in densely populated areas.47
Noncombatants and Noncombatant Objects.
Dispersing combatants and military objects into the
civilian community is offensive to international law because 
it violates the principle that defenders have an obligation to
separate military targets from civilians and their
property.48 Iraq was rightly criticized for purposely ignoring 
this tenet during the Gulf War.49 But as societies become
increasingly technologically integrated and, more
importantly, dependent upon technology, separating
military and civilian facilities becomes immensely more
complicated, even for morally conscious statesmen and
soldiers.
Largely due to budgetary pressures, the United States
itself can no longer afford to maintain very many high-tech
capabilities separate from those found in the civilian sector
(where the cutting-edge technology often first appears50).
Professor Dan Kuehl of the National Defense University’s
School of Information Warfare worries that this “growing
intermingling in the integrated information society of
systems used and needed by both the military and civil sides 
of society . . . is making our national information infra-
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structure a viable, legal, and ethical target in the case of
conflict.”51 Nowhere is this use more extensive than in the
communications’ area.52 The U.S. armed forces—like other
modern militaries—relies heavily upon the civilian
communications infrastructure; more than 90 percent of its
messages flow through commercial channels.53 If that
system is attacked by a belligerent intent upon cutting that
flow, what does its loss mean to noncombatants in today’s
society?
Attacks against communications nodes and their related 
computer facilities do more than just inconvenience people
in technologically advanced societies. Such systems support 
essential emergency services and quite often control critical
parts of the infrastructure indispensable to civilians,
especially in vulnerable urban areas. Consequently, strikes
against electrical grids, designed to undermine a military’s
high-tech computer and communications capabilities, have
profound—and often unintended—“reverberating effects”
on noncombatants and their high-tech systems.54 
Statesmen and soldiers must consider the legal and
moral ramifications of using civilian systems for military
purposes. Such military use may turn them—as well as
their supporting infrastructure—into a bona fide target for
future opponents. Parenthetically, statesmen and soldiers
must also ask themselves the practical question as to
whether they are creating target sets whose destruction
could cause undue noncombatant hardships in the United
States without a corresponding vulnerability for
adversaries from less-developed countries.
Of course, depending upon the adversary, attacks on
their dual-use systems could be equally devastating to their
civilian populace. Thus, it is essential for statesmen and
soldiers to avoid the misconception that “surgical” strikes
using certain high-tech methodologies (PGMs or even a
“bloodless” computer attacks) necessarily obviates legal and 
moral complications just because the immediate casualties
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(including noncombatant losses) may be few.55 Commander
James W. Crawford explains:
Precision technology limits the immediate and direct harmful
effects of aerial bombardment. However, one must take issue
with the assertion that the systematic destruction of the civil
infrastructure through the use of precision weapons actually
reduces the harmful effects of war. Ironically, the very
capability of precision potentially augers greater collateral
casualties, not less . . . [PGMs are] clearly an efficient and
effective application of force. . . . Unfortunately, such a
methodology not only impedes the enemy in some respects, but 
it also eliminates civilian life-support systems.56
Attacks on dual-use systems need not, however, be
foregone. Rather, what is needed is a firm grasp of the
long-term, indirect impact upon noncombatants prior to the
authorization of an attack. Clearly, an enhanced
intelligence architecture is necessary to provide the right
kind of data to conduct the more probing proportionality
calculation these new technologies require.57 
One way of analyzing the data that an enhanced
intelligence system might provide would be to employ the
new modeling and simulation techniques now becoming
available. For example, using data drawn from Joint
Resource Assessment Data Base, U.S. Strategic
Command’s Strategic War Planning System (SWPS) can
project the expected numbers of killed and injured when a
given nuclear weapon is delivered by a designated platform
in a certain fashion on the selected target.58 Similar systems 
could be developed to analyze the effects of conventional
attacks on high-tech networks.
However, modeling and simulation themselves present
significant recomplications for statesmen and soldiers.
Specifically, are leaders legally or morally obliged to follow
the model? Suppose, for example, that a decisionmaker
chooses a course of action that the model shows will result in 
greater noncombatant casualties than another available
option. Since the legal and moral duty is to “take all feasible
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precautions” to avoid noncombatant casualties,59 if a
computer calculates that a certain method of attack among
several options most minimizes noncombatant loses, does
that automatically preclude consideration of the other
options? If a commander selects another option, has he
failed to do everything “feasible” to avoid noncombatant
losses? How will a commander justify a decision that seems
to fly in the face of dispassionate computer logic? Consider
that casualty estimates from whatever source can create
very real quandaries for commanders at a later time. In the
recent controversy over the decision to use the atomic bomb
on Japan to end World War II, the relatively crude casualty
estimates of nearly 50 years ago were relied upon by some to
assert that an invasion would have cost fewer lives than the
atomic attack.60
What the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki did do, however, was to evaporate what was left of
the Japanese government’s will to resist. The object in war
is to break the enemy and to impose our will in its stead.
That is best accomplished with a combination of
psychological and physical shock. The dropping of two
atomic bombs in August 1945 seems to have accomplished
that objective.
As technology progresses, one might fairly expect the
fidelity of the models to improve,61 but it is not yet clear that
they can ever substitute for the judgment of the commander
in the performance of the warfighting art. The linear,
mathematical nature of computer processes may never be
able to replicate the nonlinear and often unquantifiable
logic of war.62 The history of human conflict is littered with
examples of how military forces achieved results that no
algorithm would have predicted.63 Still, in a world that
increasingly considers reports provided by an electronic
brain innately more authoritative than human-derived
analyses, it may well behoove decisionmakers in future
conflicts to somehow capture the essence of their rationale
when they select a computer-produced option that on its
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face seems to be more casualty-intensive than another
course of action assessed by the same source.
Paralleling the problematic commingling of military and 
civilian high-tech facilities is the infusion of civilians into
formerly military jobs. In the past few years there has been
a determined effort to convert as many military billets as
possible to less expensive civilian positions.64 For much the
same reason, other efforts have attempted to privatize and
outsource many functions traditionally performed by
uniformed personnel. These initiatives have resulted in
thousands of civilians filling what were once military
assignments at stateside bases and, increasingly, on foreign 
deployments.65
While these actions are principally motivated by a desire 
to save scarce defense dollars, they are also a tacit recog-
nition that the growing sophistication of the technologies of
war require the military to ever more frequently tap civilian
expertise. Armed Forces Journal reports, for example, that
in fiscal year 1997, 70 percent of the Department of
Defense’s information technology transactions were
outsourced to private vendors.66
This trend exacerbates the long-held fear that new
technology requiring ever-greater civilian involvement will
cloud a principle vital to the law of armed conflict:67 the
requirement to distinguish between combatants who could
be legitimately attacked, and noncombatants who could not. 
As with civilian objects, current international law requires
belligerents to exercise “care to separate individual civilians 
and the civilian population as such from the vicinity of
military objectives.”68
International law does, however, recognize that civilian
technicians and contractors are necessary for modern
militaries. It holds that they are subject to attack only when
actually performing tasks in support of the armed forces.
Unlike uniformed personnel, they would not ordinarily be
targeted when they are away from their jobs. If captured,
they are entitled to treatment as prisoners of war.69
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Nonetheless, the law has always held that noncombatants’
“immunity from damage and harm was predicated upon
their obligation to abstain from hostile acts. If they took
action against a party’s armed forces, they automatically
lost immunity.”70
Unfortunately, that appears to be exactly the direction
we are heading. Defense News characterized the large
numbers of civilian technicians required for the Army’s
digitized battlefield as “surrogate warriors.”71 Indeed, the
operation of high-technology systems is moving civilian
technicians and contractors from traditional support
functions to what are arguably “hostile” activities. For
example, a civilian technician who helps execute a
computerized offensive information attack against an
enemy system may well have gone beyond mere “support.”
Likewise, the Air Force, probably unaware of the
implications of its statement, has openly announced its
intention to use civilians operationally. In Global
Engagement: A Vision for the 21st Century Air Force, the
service states that “combat operations in the 21st Century”
will broaden “the definition of the future operator.”72 It goes
on to state that: “In the future, any military or civilian
member who is experienced in the employment and doctrine 
of air and space power will be considered an operator.”73
Once civilian technicians or contractors become involved 
as “operators” in “combat operations,” they risk being
characterized as “unlawful combatants” under inter-
national law.74 This has a number of consequences,
including the possibility that if captured they can be tried
and punished for their hostile acts, to include the same
things for which a uniformed combatant would be
immune.74 It is very doubtful that many of these “surrogate
warriors” are cognizant of their new status or comprehend
the ramifications of it.
Since it is unlikely that military dependence on civilian
expertise will diminish any time soon, several writers
suggest establishing a new type of part-time military.75 It
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would be composed of engineers, information specialists,
and other technical experts who could be called into military 
service when necessary. Endowing civilians with military
status would support recognition as lawful combatants
under international law, and would also be a step toward
solving another problem with civilianizing military
functions: the fact that civilians cannot be compelled to stay
on the job in times of crisis.77 Only those subject to military
discipline have a legal or moral responsibility to remain at
their posts.
While this approach would solve one technology-driven
problem, it creates a new recomplication for statesmen and
soldiers. Specifically, these proposals differ from ordinary
Guard and Reserve membership in that the military
affiliation contemplated would not require the technical
experts to undergo all the rigors of military training.78 In
describing such an organization composed of information
specialists, Brigadier General Bruce M. Lawlor, ARNG,
argues that the well-paid “innovators, intellectuals, and
highly-skilled technicians” most needed would “not likely be 
impressed by the opportunity to wear hair ‘high and tight’ or 
do pushups and two-mile runs.” 79 Accordingly, he
recommends that “much of the military regimen” be
discarded.80
Soldiers and statesmen need to be cautious, however,
about abandoning “much of the military regimen” simply to
indulge the predilections of civilian technical experts.
Military personnel are not just people in uniforms. There
are instead, as Stephen Crane, the author of Red Badge of
Courage, put it, “a mysterious fraternity born out of smoke
and the danger of death.”81 In his book, Acts of War: The
Behavior of Men in Battle, Richard Holmes explains:
However much sociologists might argue that we live in an age
of “narrowing skill differentials,” where many of the soldier’s
tasks are growing ever closer to those of his civilian
contemporaries, it is an inescapable fact that the soldier’s
primary function, the use—or threatened use—of force, sets
him apart from civilians . . . [T]he fact remains that someone
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who joins an army, is both crossing a well-defined border within
the fabric of society, and becoming a member of an organization
which, in the last analysis, may require him to kill or be killed.82
Importantly, Holmes argues that much of the military’s
regimen (even including such things as haircuts) has
psychological importance beyond its obvious practical
value. Many military requirements and rituals serve to
acculturate an individual to the armed forces and to build
the kind of unit cohesion and esprit de corps necessary to
endure the enormous pressures of combat. Importantly, for
statesmen and soldiers concerned about the ethical conduct
of war, such a transformation also helps to create a selfless,
morally conscious combatant.
The uncertainties and unpredictable dynamics of 21st
century battlefields make it unwise to assume that
technical experts will always be in situations that render
unnecessary the kind of bonding and mental preparation
that has sustained winning military organizations for
centuries. Notwithstanding the need to secure sufficient
numbers of technical experts for 21st century conflicts,
statesmen and soldiers must be especially wary of any
actions that might erode the altruistic warrior ethos that
underpins instinctively proper behavior in the crucible of
war.
Civilianizing uniformed positions is not the only way the
U.S. defense establishment hopes to deal with tight
budgets. Innovative applications of technology are also
expected to help control costs. But cost is a two-edged sword
in the context of the RMA. While computers and other
information technologies often produce economies, the price 
of many new weapons is still quite high. PGMs, for example,
are significantly more expensive than unguided “dumb”
bombs.83 This fact produces a new question for statesmen
and soldiers: to what extent must a nation’s people sacrifice
in order to acquire systems to protect enemy civilians? If a
relatively inexpensive artillery barrage can neutralize an
enemy force notwithstanding a few noncombatant
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casualties, is the commander obliged to employ a costly bevy 
of PGMs to reduce that number to zero? It could be argued
that simply having PGMs mandates their use under the
theory that the commander has an available alternative
that can save noncombatant lives. The accepted view,
however, holds that there is no per se obligation to use PGMs 
so long as the tenets of the law of armed conflict are
observed.84 The commander can properly consider the price
of the weapons as a factor in deciding the means of attack.85
For statesmen and soldiers, however, there is the further 
question of expectations raised by Gulf War videos of
PGMs.86 Undoubtedly, the perception that PGM use avoids
virtually all collateral losses is something that could create
a new precept in the court of world opinion. A paradigm
might arise that assumes that if the United States wishes to
do so, it can employ force via PGMs in any circumstance
with few or no noncombatant casualties.87
It is the converse that statesmen and soldiers may find
most vexing, that is, the perception that the failure to use
PGMs represents a considered American decision to cause
noncombatant deaths. If this perception comes to represent
the consensus of world opinion, it is not inconceivable that
international law may someday require PGM use (as well as
other high-tech instrumentalities) by those nations with the 
resources to produce or acquire them.88 At first blush such a
development would appear to be morally and ethically
attractive, but consider that even for wealthy nations like
the United States, national budgets are zero-sum games.
For each dollar spent to acquire an expensive PGM, one less
dollar is available for other desirable social purposes.
President Dwight Eisenhower captured this dilemma in a
1953 speech when he pointed out that:
Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket
fired, signifies in the final sense a theft from those who hunger
and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. The
world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the
sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists and the hopes
of its children.89
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This raises an intriguing question: To what extent is the
civilian populace of an aggressive belligerent entitled to the
treasure of a rightful defender?90 How many of the rightful
defender’s own people should be denied, for example,
prenatal care to make resources available to procure PGMs
so that if it must defend itself the danger of collateral
civilian casualties in the aggressor state is minimized? In
analyzing this question one may wish to ponder historian
Daniel Boorstin’s contention that Americans suffer from the 
“Myth of Popular Innocence,” that is, the tendency to
demonize enemy leaders but absolve adversary populations
of responsibility in war.91 Americans often assume that
enemy societies are helpless victims of powerful tyrants—
despite evidence, Boorstin contends, that “[r]ecent history
proves that ruthless rulers can be removed by popular
will.”92
Even if one chooses to exculpate the populations of
totalitarian states, technology may yet recomplicate moral
judgments when addressed to nations with other forms of
government, especially democracies. Proponents insist that
the phenomenal growth of the Internet and other
communication technologies has helped stimulate the rise
of democracies around the world. A September 1997 article
in the New York Times Magazine credits modern
communications technologies with spurring the growth of
democracy and forcing totalitarian regimes to wither.93
Another author, analyzing the nature of advanced com-
munications capabilities, maintains that high technology
and totalitarian governments are “oxymorons.”94 Thus, if
revolutionary communications systems produce democra-
cies as the enthusiasts contend, then we are on the verge of a 
new era of techno-peace as conventional wisdom holds that
“democracies don’t fight democracies.”95
Regrettably, however, new studies are eroding the
“democratic peace” thesis.96 In truth, the notion that
democracies may indeed fight democracies should not really 
be surprising given the growing evidence of war’s cultural
basis.97 According to Samuel Huntington, future conflicts
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may well arise not from nations in the grip of a depraved
leader (as Americans are wont to believe) but rather from
clashes between civilizations whose basic values are
fundamentally at odds.98 Bosnia presents a manifestation of 
Huntington’s hypothesis. Henry Kissinger argues that it
was a misconception that the removal of a few “evil bigots”
there would create unity and peace in a society where
deep-seated ethnic hatreds pervade the populations.99
Quite obviously, Americans must learn to accept that whole
societies may freely choose to embark upon courses of action
that lead to war.100
Still, international law has never sought to necessarily
equate “noncombatant” status with moral innocence. But
should the sentient, adult population in a democracy escape
responsibility for their nation’s actions in an era when
science is globalizing weapons of mass destruction? James
W. Child contends, for example, in Nuclear War: The Moral
Dimension that “people have a duty to restrain their
government from committing nuclear aggression, and if
they fail in that duty, their absolute immunity as
noncombatants is undermined.”101 Even the U.S.’s
Declaration of Independence asserts the Lockean concept
that people have a duty “to alter or abolish” their
government when it fails to serve “life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness.”102 Though beyond the scope of this
paper, it may be appropriate for statesmen and soldiers to
reexamine the question of the culpability of democratic
societies engaged in high-tech conflict. That examination
could indicate that—at least where democratic states are
concerned—a modification of current understanding of
“noncombatant” immunity might be in order, especially
when such states engage in unlawful acts such as the
wrongful use of a weapon of mass destruction.
Information Operations.
The idea that democratic societies might properly be
held accountable for the unlawful actions of their
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governments raises the broader question as to whether
democracies ought to be exempted from certain kinds of
information operations that aim to corrupt the democratic
process. Powerful information and cyberwar technologies
are becoming available that can radically affect an
electorate’s perceptions of its leaders. Thomas Czerwinski,
then a professor at the School of Information Warfare of the
National Defense University, indicates how such
technologies might be used when he asks: “What would
happen if you took Saddam Hussein’s image, altered it, and
projected it back to Iraq showing him voicing doubts about
his own Baath Party?”103 Quite obviously, the technology
implicit in Czerwinski’s proposition could just as easily be
applied against a democratically-elected leader.
Moreover, the capability is hardly science fiction. As
anyone who has seen the film, Forest Gump, can attest,
technology now permits the creation of extraordinarily
convincing but false images.104 Of course, propaganda
aimed at enemy populations has long been considered a
legitimate method of warfare. But this norm may need
reexamination when the government affected is a
democratic one. It needs to be reconciled with a key
component of U.S. national security policy: the promotion of
democracy.105 While no one would dispute that the improper 
actions of the leaders of any enemy state—including those of 
democracies—must be stemmed, it is something altogether
different to hold that it is an appropriate strategy to attempt 
to change democratically-elected leadership via the
dissemination of manipulated information.106
Furthermore, Michael Walzer asserts that “war aims
legitimately reach to the destruction or defeat,
demobilization, and (partial) disarming of the aggressor’s
armed forces. Except in extreme cases, like that of Nazi
Germany, they don’t legitimately reach to the transforma-
tion of the internal politics of the aggressor state or the
replacement of its regime.”107 Surely, a democratic
government is not the kind of extreme case that Walzer
exempts. Thus, statesmen and soldiers may wish to develop
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policies that restrain information warriors from engaging in 
tactics that damage the democratic process. Democracy has
an intrinsic human value even when it produces
governments whose actions lead to war.
The interplay of democratic values and modern
technology presents other recomplications for statesmen
and soldiers. Specifically, JV 2010 insists that the U.S.
military must have “information superiority” in future
conflicts. To do so requires not simply controlling the
adversary’s information sources, but also the avalanche of
data available from third parties, including the global
media. This latter source would be extremely difficult to
dominate.108 With the latest technology freeing the press
from reliance on—and control by—belligerent govern-
ments,109 it is unlikely that any major aspect of future
military operations will escape near-instantaneous
reporting by international news agencies. In a very real
sense, global news sources could become the “poor man’s
intelligence service.”
In addition, information about current operations will be 
obtainable from other sources for a modest investment.
Already commercial satellites are providing high-resolution 
images heretofore the exclusive province of the intelligence
agencies of the developed nations.110 Another information
source, the Internet, is now being described as a “simple,
low-cost, non-threatening and relatively risk-free” way of
collecting data valuable to intelligence agencies.111 All of
this makes a strategy of information superiority
questionable.
Thus, the capabilities of new technology present
statesmen and soldiers with several unattractive options. If
“information superiority” is truly imperative, achieving it
may require aggressive, draconian measures against
international information sources that are not parties to the 
conflict. Such measures are of doubtful legal and moral
validity, and they could have the unintended consequence of 
antagonizing allies and even bringing the United States
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into conflict with third parties.112 Another approach might
be to develop means that discretely deny the transmission of 
internationally produced information to an adversary.
Given the number and variety of sources, however, it would
not seem practical or even possible to do so. Finally, we
could change our approach, that is, develop doctrine and
strategies for conducting military operations in an
environment of information transparency or information
parity. It seems that this last alternative, which obviates
the need to interfere with information produced by entities
not otherwise involved in the particular conflict, would most 
readily mesh with our legal and moral norms.
Space.
As already implied, any discussion of information
operations necessarily brings up the issue of space.
Satellites provide critical surveillance and communication
support for U.S. forces, as well as those of potential
adversaries. According to General Charles A. Horner, space
systems are “fundamental to modern warfare.”113 For
example, PGMs, the weapons that so many hope will
produce more humane warfare, very often require
satellite-derived information for guidance.114 Because of the 
importance of space to high-tech operations, American
military leaders believe that war in space is inevitable.115
Accordingly, several preparatory steps have been taken,
including testing laser weapons against satellites.116
However, space warfare presents significant moral
recomplications for statesmen and soldiers. Most
fundamentally, there is the question as to whether combat
operations ought to be conducted there at all. In fact, the
nature of space systems creates legal and ethical reasons
that weigh against doing so. As previously discussed, a basic 
LOAC principle is the obligation of belligerents to separate
military targets from civilian objects.117 Since the very
beginning of space exploration, however, military and
civilian developments commingled to a such a degree that
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“the separation of military from civilian . . . space technology 
[is] meaningless.”118 While there are some purely military
systems today,119 the United States itself relies heavily on
civilian satellites, many of which are owned by inter-
national consortiums.120 
Future opponents will likewise depend upon commercial 
communication and surveillance systems.121 As a result,
space presents the classic legal and moral conundrum of
multi-user systems: how do you attack them without
causing disproportionate injury to noncombatants and their 
property, especially when the same system is used by
nations not involved in the conflict? As a practical matter, it
is difficult to foresee many scenarios where a proportion-
ality analysis122  would justify attacks on multi-user
systems. This is especially true as noncombatants in a
growing number of countries become ever more reliant on
space-based technologies for a whole range of essential
communications and other services.
Nonetheless, U.S. Space Command is seeking to have
“space” declared its area of operations so as to facilitate
planning for conflict there.123 Little international appetite
exists for the notion of militarizing space, however.
Virtually every treaty related to space asserts that it is to be
used only for “peaceful purposes.”124 (The United States
interprets these provisions to prohibit only aggressive
military actions.125) Is it wise, therefore, for the United
States to take actions—such as declaring space as an area of 
operations for one of its combatant commands—that
suggest that space is simply another field of battle?126
Should statesmen and soldiers advocate a course of action
that might stimulate a space arms race, akin to the nuclear
arms race, as many fear?127 
It may be shrewder to pursue a legal regime that
declares space a “sanctuary” similar to that afforded
communications facilities located in neutral territory.128
This would permit any nation to use space for
communications, surveillance, and comparable activities—
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even during armed conflicts—with the systems not being
subject to attack. Arguably, this strategy would renew the
U.S.’s original policy toward space. President Eisenhower
established a “self-imposed space sanctuary policy . . . [in
order to] establish the principle of freedom of space, to
protect U.S. satellites from interference, and to avoid an
arms race in space. . . .”129 “Neutralizing” space would not
appear to degrade America’s warfighting capability if U.S.
space systems were therefore protected and, in any event,
existing legal and policy norms already limit or preclude
attack on the multi-user international systems that
adversaries will rely upon during war.
This proposal would not preclude sub-space means that
selectively deny adversaries’ military forces the use of
signals from space platforms. However, the development of
lasers and other space weapons would be prohibited,
although passive defensive measures (hardening, stealth,
etc.) would be allowed. Accordingly, the proposal would not
be inconsistent with current U.S. space policy, which
advocates diplomatic and legal “measures to preclude an
adversary’s hostile use of space systems and services.”130
Some may argue that the movement of weaponry into space
is inevitable and cannot be effectively banned.131 But the
remarkable history of nuclear arms control (during which
many of the same arguments were made) leaves room for
optimism—especially if action is taken soon.
Threshold of Conflict.
Another recomplicating effect of the new technologies is
the danger that they may inadvertently lead to a lowering of 
the threshold of violent conflict. Peacetime information
operations are one example of how this might occur.
Consider, for instance, that there is no clearly accepted
definition of what kind of data manipulation constitutes
“aggression” contrary to international law and condemned
by the U.N. Charter.132 Current interpretations of
“aggression” were largely built upon notions of “armed
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attack” committed by aggressors employing traditional
kinetic-effect weapons.133 While legal definitions of “armed
attack” may seem to allow peacetime data manipulations so
long as bombs or bullets are not used,134 the recipient
country may not share such a pacific interpretation and
react violently, starting a cycle of escalation unintended by
the initiating info-warriors.
The growing proliferation of the popular new
“non-lethal” technologies presents similar recomplica-
tions.135 Part of the recomplication results from mis-
understanding the terminology. The characterization of
these capabilities as “non-lethal,” for example, is a source of
real confusion—virtually all of them are potentially deadly
to some persons.136  Moreover, certain of them also clash
with existing treaties such as those that limit or prohibit the 
use of chemical and biological agents.137 Consequently,
while items like rubber bullets, sticky foam, and so forth do
have the potential to lower the risk of casualties in
particular situations, there is the danger that decision-
makers will be seduced by the same misconception
discussed previously in this essay, that is, the flawed notion
that military operations can be conducted without risk to
soldiers or civilians.138
All of this is especially worrisome because of the
unpredictability of the reaction of those against whom
supposedly nonlethal means are used. To reiterate a central
theme of this essay: what was intended as a “bloodless”
means of coercion may well generate a lethal response. It
would seem prudent then for statesmen and soldiers to view
information operations and “non-lethal” technologies
principally as means to minimize noncombatant casualties
under circumstances where the use of force is otherwise
necessary and appropriate. If this is clearly understood,
miscalculation is averted, and the unintended involvement
in unexpectedly hostile situations is precluded.139
It is worth noting that a similar issue exists with regard
to other high-tech systems. Indeed, the post-Gulf War uses
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of PGMs against Iraq raise the issue. Quite often the
declared purpose is to “send a message” to that government,
a function traditionally the role of a diplomatic bag.
Analysts A. J. Bacevich and Lawrence F. Kaplan ask,
“Given the precision weapons that the United States
advertises as central to the new American military doctrine, 
how many people is it permissible to kill merely to send a
message?”140
It is true that affecting the psychology of an adversary
could constitute a legitimate military objective.141 The
difficulty, as Geoffrey Best notes, is quantifying the often
very subjective estimates of psychological effects into
something rational enough to support a meaningful finding
of the “definite military advantage” that the law requires to
warrant the use of force.142 How does one definitively assess, 
for example, the psychological effect of an incremental use of 
force on persons of another culture?143 Absent the
supporting data, the use of force for psychological purposes
may be difficult to justify. The real issue for statesmen and
soldiers is ensuring that the casualty-minimizing features
of high-tech weaponry do not induce decisionmakers to
inappropriately lower the threshold for the use force.
Bacevich and Kaplan warn:
Ultimately, a doctrine that relies on antiseptic methods of
warfare may prove dangerously seductive. Seemingly tailor-
made for an era of post-modern politics, precision weapons also
have the potential to increase the propensity of political leaders
to resort to violent means. The ready availability of [PGMs] may
tempt them to conclude that force need no longer remain the
option of last resort, and induce them to employ their arsenal
without due reflection.144
Organizational Culture.
High technology also carries potential unexpected
consequences for the organizational cultures of militaries
on 21st century battlefields. Communications advances will 
be the most important agent of organizational change. As
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JV 2010145 indicates, technology is already becoming
available that will provide individual soldiers with
unprecedented access to all kinds of information.146 Such
technology will allow the elimination of various levels of
command and supervision resulting in a “flattening” of
traditionally hierarchical military organizations. Other
technology fathered changes will directly affect battlefield
organization. The Marine Corps, for example, is experi-
menting with a new concept called “infestation tactics”
which capitalizes on the new technologies.147 The technique
relies on advanced communications systems to coordinate
large numbers of small infantry teams assaulting the same
objective.
While increased combat effectiveness should result from
these and other technology-driven organizational changes,
there are, nevertheless, potential “revenge effects” of
concern to statesmen and soldiers. In his book, The
Unintended Consequences of Information Age Technologies,
David S. Alberts warns that when subordinates are
provided with the “larger picture” that new data transfer
capabilities allow, they are “likely to second-guess decisions
made at higher levels and . . . have the information required
to undertake initiatives their superiors may find
inappropriate.”148
It seems therefore that, ironically, controlling the
actions of lower echelon troops may not necessarily be
enhanced by better communications technologies.
Regrettably, it is at those very levels that the risk of
indiscipline is the greatest—the My Lai massacre during
the Vietnam War being just one example.149 Sadly,
atrocities seem to be an enduring feature of war. Stephen
Ambrose notes that:
When you put young people, eighteen, nineteen, or twenty
years old, in a foreign country with weapons in their hands,
sometimes terrible things happen that you wish never
happened. This is a reality that stretches across time and
across continents. It is a universal aspect of war, from the time
of the ancient Greeks up to the present.150
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What is worrisome about 21st century battlefield
technology is that it will put ready access to vastly more
potent firepower into the hands of the young troops that
Ambrose describes. The new battlefield organization
produced by infestation tactics is illustrative. Analysts
assert that the “most revolutionary aspect” of the new
concept is that the infantryman does not rely on his personal 
weapon to engage the enemy, but will instead call in
external fire support.151 In short, the experts say, “[r]ather
than a “shooter,” the infantryman becomes a “spotter.’”152
They further observe that:
This change of identity for the infantryman stems from
technological advances. With enhanced digital communi-
cations, more accurate smart munitions, and manportable
guidance systems, fire support . . . is the king of the battlefield.
In addition to traditional tube artillery, the individual team can
call for and direct close air support, rocket fires, naval gunfire,
and missile attacks.153
Quite obviously, whatever havoc troops were able to
wreak with their personal weapons at places like My Lai,
that terrible potential will be markedly greater in future
conflicts because of the new technologies of war,
particularly since the command and supervisory structure
that might intervene is, by design, less robust.
By empowering junior personnel, the new technologies
of war create other recomplications as well. Aviation Week & 
Space Technology reports that senior American officials are
concerned about the effect of the absence of clear rules
concerning information operations.154 They believe that
“Once soldiers and airmen start dying in a war, the young
computer-literate officers and enlisted men are going to
start making their own efforts to crack enemy computer
systems.”155 Free-lance efforts of this sort can create serious
problems. For example, a computer virus loosed on an
enemy might have “unintended consequences and come
back and cripple friendly computers.”156 The adverse
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“reverberating effects” of such actions on noncombatants
may be quite significant.
Still, the solution is not to deny lower echelons the
benefits of the technology. Rather, when technology
dramatically empowers junior personnel, steps must be
taken to ensure that they are fully prepared, both
technically and psychologically, to handle the greater legal
and moral responsibilities that the enhanced capabilities
impose upon them. Unquestionably, maintaining discipline
and professionalism under the new combat conditions is
more essential than ever—yet ever more difficult to
guarantee.
Another recomplicating effect is caused by the
proliferating numbers of e-mail-equipped laptop
computers, fax machines, and similar technologies that
troops themselves own and carry with them into war
zones.157 What is more is that, according to Congressman
Newt Gingrich, “virtually every soldier in combat in 2010
will have somewhere on their body a personal telephone
linked by satellite to a world telephone network.”158 Such
devices raise a number of complications, not the least of
which is that they are extremely vulnerable to monitoring
by hostile forces.159 
Equally important is that these devices hasten the day
when the authority of the military commander could be
questioned on the battlefield—a development with
potentially disastrous consequences. Instant communi-
cations by soldiers from future battlefields causes Nicholas
Wade to question, “Would any commander want his soldiers
to receive parental advice in the midst of a firefight? What if
Dad disagrees with the officer in the scene? As Napoleon
said, ‘one bad general is better than two good ones.’ ”160
Similarly, Newsweek asked over 6 years ago, “if soldiers can
phone mom or the local newspaper from the middle of the
battlefield, what are the implications for maintaining
military discipline or secrecy?”161
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To answer such concerns some commanders will attempt 
to restrict the use of these communications devices. But is
this realistic? Can a democracy reliant on an all-volunteer
force expect to isolate forward-deployed troops from contact
with their friends and families, especially when they may
have grown up in an environment of instant communi-
cations gratification? It may be more practical, as suggested
previously, to abandon the goal of information security and
plan accordingly.162
Finally, the inculcation of the revolutionary technologies 
into the armed services might create a generation of
“console warriors” who wage war without ever confronting
the deadly consequences of their actions. Statesmen and
soldiers should not assume that such combatants will
automatically share the military’s traditional values that
restrain illegal and immoral conduct in war. Up until now,
much of the military’s ethos was drawn from concepts of
honor and chivalry sourced in the physical reality of direct
combat. Although the extent to which the proliferation of
long-distance push-button war serves to replace that ethos
with a new ethic is as yet uncertain, it is imperative that
whatever emerges instills in tomorrow’s soldiers those
moral underpinnings which will further develop the
application of ethical and legal norms in future conflicts. 
Summary and Conclusions.
At this point, the reader may agree that the promise of
the introduction of this essay has been fulfilled: far more
questions have been raised than solutions offered.
Hopefully, it is now clear that despite their many beneficial
aspects, the emerging RMA technologies have great
capacity for unintended consequences and revenge effects.
Our examination reveals several broad themes that
statesmen and soldiers may wish to address:
· The unpredictability of an adversary’s response to
high-tech attack. While U.S. intent in using PGMs or
other high-tech means in a particular conflict might
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be to minimize casualties on both sides, their use may, 
nevertheless, drive an enemy incapable of responding
in kind to resort to measures that could make war,
paradoxically, more destructive or inhumane than if
the high-tech weapons had not been used at all.
· The increasing commingling of military and civilian
high-tech systems. Although this dual- and multi-use
trend is unlikely to change in the future, greater
consideration should be given to the moral and legal
implications of making legitimate targets out of
systems upon which technology-dependent societies
rely. Where possible, steps should be taken to ensure
that essential services are preserved in the event of
war. At a minimum, decision-support systems need to
be developed not only to analyze the vulnerability of
friendly populations but also to assess high-tech
targets in hostile countries in order to assist military
commanders in making an informed proportionality
judgment. Such systems need to be able to evaluate
secondary, reverberating effects on civilian
populations.
· The blurring of the distinction between noncombatant
civilians and combatant military personnel .
Technologies, along with budget-driven decisions to
outsource and privatize and otherwise civilianize
military functions,  carry moral and legal
implications. Care must be taken to ensure that a
whole class of  unlawful combatants is not
inadvertently created. There may be utility in
devising new kinds of reserve organizations for
technologically skilled personnel which do not require 
members to conform to all the rigors of a professional
military. However, such efforts must not compromise
those aspects of the military regimen that develop
military’s altruistic, warrior ethos which underpins
moral conduct in war.
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· Information operations. Information operations (IO)
and cyberwar can complicate the moral life for
statesmen and soldiers in many ways, but of
particular concern are the new techniques that can
interfere with democratic societies. IO and cyberwar
techniques are properly applied to control the
aggressive behavior of nations, but they should not be
permitted to destroy democratic values in the process. 
Moreover, the proliferation of third-party communi-
cations sources renders suspect military strategies
aimed at achieving information superiority.
· The militarization of space . Satellites and space
vehicles are irrevocably integrated into modern
warfare. However, this does not mean that space
should become another battlefield. Rather, the United 
States should use its prestige as the preeminent space 
power to forge an international consensus that
designates space a neutral area and, therefore,
possibly avoid a space weapons race.
· The lowering of the threshold of conflict. Advanced
technology provides the capability to employ coercion
via non- or low-lethal means in a way that greatly
minimizes the immediate noncombatant losses.
Because of the unpredictability of the response of
those targeted, however, care must be taken to ensure
that misapprehensions of the nature and implications 
of military means do not delude decisionmakers with
visions of “bloodlessly” compelling opponents short of
violent conflict. Absent such caution we risk taking
actions with the dangerous potential to spin out of
control into full-scale war.
· Organizational Culture. Vastly enhanced communi-
cations capabilities that shift more and more battle-
field responsibilities to lower-levels of command must
be accompanied by appropriate training to ensure
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that legal and moral norms of the law of war are
observed by technology-empowered junior personnel.
These are by no means all the high technology issues
with potential to recomplicate moral life for 21st century
statesmen and soldiers. Of course, it would be a mistake to
conclude that the problems just discussed somehow
warrant a retreat from infusing RMA technology into
defense planning. After all, high-tech weapons ordinarily do 
have their intended effect—and sometimes that is the
unexpected consequence. For example, military historian
Martin Van Creveld observes that, ironically, “in every
region where [nuclear weapons] have been introduced,
large-scale, interstate war has as good as disappeared.”163
In short, however horrific their potential, nuclear weapons
have successfully performed the deterrent function that
creators hoped they would, to the surprise of a myriad of
naysayers. To many it is, perhaps, the ultimate
unexpected—though not unintended—consequence that
the advent of the nuclear age has coincided with the absence 
of the kind of savage global war that twice visited the world
this century.
While technology can obviously deter war, it is still true
that “technology and warfare have never been far apart.”164
Clearly, statesmen and soldiers need to be concerned about
procuring the technology necessary for U.S. forces to prevail 
in any conflict. Analysts Ronald Haycock and Keith Neilson
ominously warn that “technology has permitted the division 
of mankind into ruler and ruled.”165 In that regard, even
America’s vaunted free-enterprise system, the engine that
fuels its technological might, has its own recomplications.
Consider that American values—in this instance the
commitment to full and fair competition within a
capitalistic economy—might deny U.S. troops the best
technology on 21st century battlefields. Author David
Shukman explains: “While the Western military struggle
for a decade on average to acquire new weapons, a country
with commercially available computer equipment and less
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rigorous democratic and accounting processes could field
new systems within a few years. It is the stuff of military
nightmares.”166 Although high-tech systems are touted as a
means to get inside an adversary’s “decision loop,”167 the
reality is that nations unencumbered by Western-style
procurement regulations may well be able to get inside our
“acquisition loop” and field newer weaponry even before the
United States finishes buying already obsolete equipment.
Just as the speed of technological change creates
difficulties for the procurement process, so it does for those
concerned with law, ethics, and policy. President Harry
Truman once remarked that he feared that “machines were
ahead of morals by some centuries.” That certainly is the
case in today’s RMA environment.168 Consequently,
statesmen and soldiers must accelerate their efforts to
develop norms of law, ethics, and policy that honor this
nation’s finest ideals while at the same time appreciating
that “technology is America’s manifest destiny.”169
This is not an easy task. Nor is the problem without
historical precedent. Russell F. Weigley notes in his 1977
classic, The American Way of War, that: “To seek refuge in
technology from hard questions of strategy and policy [is]
another dangerous American tendency, fostered by the
pragmatic qualities of the American character and by the
complexities of nuclear-age technology.” Quite obviously
statesmen and soldiers must recognize technology’s
potential, but they must do so with the clear understanding
that it will never substitute for answering the kind of “hard
questions” of law, ethics, and policy that will continue to
recomplicate moral life on 21st century battlefields.
ENDNOTES
1. Viet Minh artillerymen fired more than 130,000 rounds from over
200 heavy cannons and mortars during the siege. See J. D. Morelock,
The Army Times Book of Great Land Battles, 1994, p. 262.
2. Bernard and Fawn Brodie, From Crossbow to H-Bomb, Midland
Edition, 1973, p. 70.
34
3. See Nathan Perry, “Revolution in Military Affairs,” National
Guard Review, Summer 1997, pp. 23, 51. (“In fact, contrary to the
opinions of many analysts, there appears to be a pattern of conflict that
follows each major step forward in military technology.”)
4. This is not to say that wars of previous eras were not destructive.
Consider that the Thirty Years War may have caused a population
decline in Europe of as much as a third. See Curt Johnson, “Thirty
Years’ War,” in Brassey’s Encyclopedia of Military History and
Biography, Franklin D. Margiotta, ed., 1994.
5. Lieutenant Commander Jeffrey A. Harley, “Information,
Technology, and Center of Gravity,” Naval War College Review, Winter
1997, pp. 65, 80. (“[T]he exposure of the American public and media only
to high-technology combat supported an aversion to casualties and an
expectation of sophistication that will not be appropriate in all future
conflicts. The danger in making this particular work a blueprint for
future conflicts is that it reinforces a growing perception that war can be
nearly bloodless.”)
6. George and Meredith Friedman, The Future of War, 1996.
7. Ibid., p. xi.
8. There are many possible definitions of information operations but 
a common official definition is that used by the Air Force, that is,
“actions taken to gain, exploit, defend, or attack information and
information systems.” Air Force Doctrine Document 1, Air Force Basic
Doctrine, September 1997, p. 44, hereinafter AFDD-1. This definition is
almost identical to that once used by the Air Force to describe
information warfare. See Captain Robert G. Hanseman, USAF, “The
Realities and Legalities of Information Warfare,” No. 42, A.F. L. Rev.,
1997, pp. 173, 176, citing USAF Fact Sheet 95-20, November 1995.
9. Cyberwar suggests a form of warfare more holistic, strategic, and
manipulative of information in its concept than the “information
operations” definition set forth in note 8 supra. AFDD-1 notes the
following:
In describing information operations, it is important to
differentiate between “information in war” and “information
warfare.” The second element, information warfare, involves
such diverse activities as psychological warfare, military
deception, electronic combat, and both physical and cyber
attack.
35
AFDD-1, Ibid. For an excellent cyberwar scenario, See John Arquilla,
“The Great Cyberwar of 2002,” Wired, February 1998, p. 122.
10. He visualized the foe’s phone system brought down by a
computer virus, logic bombs ravaging the transportation network, false
orders confusing the adversary’s military, the opponent’s television
broadcasts jammed with propaganda messages, and the enemy leader’s
bank account electronically zeroed out. All of this is expected to cause
the adversary to give up. See Douglas Waller, “Onward Cyber Soldiers,”
Time, August 21, 1995, p. 38.
11. The Department of Defense defines these weapons as follows:
Weapons that are explicitly designed and primarily employed so 
as to incapacitate personnel or material, while minimizing
fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired
damage to property and the environment. Unlike conventional
lethal weapons that destroy their targets principally through
blast, penetration and fragmentation, non-lethal weapons
employ means other than gross physical destruction to prevent
the target from functioning. Non-lethal weapons are intended to 
have one, or both, of the following characteristics: a., they have
relatively reversible effects on personnel or material; b., they
affect objects differently within their area of influence.
Nonlethal Weapons: Terms and References, USAF Institute for National 
Security Studies, Colorado Springs, CO, Robert J. Bunker, ed., July
1997, p. ix, citing Department of Defense Directive 3000.3, Policy for
Non-Lethal Weapons, July 9, 1996.
12. For a discussions of “the revolution in military affairs” in the
information age, see, generally, “Select Enemy. Delete.,” The
Economist, March 8, 1997, p. 21; Eliot A. Cohen, “A Revolution in
Warfare,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 1996, p. 37; Andrew F.
Krepinevich, “Cavalry to Computers: The Pattern of Military
Revolutions,” The National Interest, Fall 1994, p. 30; and James R.
Fitzsimonds and Jan M. Van Tol, “Revolutions in Military Affairs,”
Joint Force Quarterly, Spring, 1994, pp. 24.
13. “The Future of Warfare,” The Economist, March 8, 1997, p. 15.
14. See Robert N. Ellithorpe, “Warfare in Transition? American
Military Culture Prepares for the Information Age,” a presentation for
the Biennial International Conference of the Inter-University Seminar
on Armed Forces and Society, Baltimore, MD, October 24-26, 1997, p.
18, “American military culture historically emphasized scientific
36
approaches to warfare to the point of holding an almost mystical belief
in the power of technology to solve the challenges of war,” unpublished
paper on file with author.
15. See, generally, Colin S. Gray, “U.S. Strategic Culture:
Implications for Defense Technology” in Defense Technology, No. 31,
Asa A. Clark IV and John F. Lilley, eds., 1989. Gray quotes George S.
Patton, Jr:
The Americans, as a race, are the foremost mechanics of the
world. America, as a nation, has the greatest ability for the
mass production of machines. It therefore behooves us to
devise methods of war which exploit our inherent superiority.
We must fight the war by machines on the ground, and in the
air, to the maximum of our ability . . . .
Ibid., citing George S. Patton, Jr., War as I Knew It, No. 345, 1947;
Bantam reprint, 1980.
16. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2010 , 1996
[hereinafter referred to as JV 2010].
17. General John M. Shalikashvili, Ibid., p. ii.
18. Ibid., p. 1.
19. Edward Tenner, Why Things Bite Back: Technology and the
Revenge of Unintended Consequences, 1996.
20. LOAC might be described as follows:
LOAC is a body of law that derives from several international
treaties, specifically, the Hague and Geneva Conventions, as
well as customary international law, law created by the
custom and practice of civilized warring states, which is
binding on all nations. It applies to all armed conflicts between 
states, thus, civil wars or battles with terrorist groups are not
covered. Hague Law is concerned mainly with the means and
methods of warfare, while Geneva Law is concerned with
protecting persons involved in conflicts, such as POWs, the
wounded, and civilians.
Hanseman, supra note 8, p. 189.
21. Geoffrey Best, Law and War Since 1945, 1994, p. 289.
37
22. W. Michael Reisman and Chris T. Antoniou, The Laws of War,
1994, p. xxiv, emphasis added.
23. See note 5, supra. This trend has led Edward Luttwak to argue
that an even greater investment in technology is required because
modern democracies simply cannot tolerate casualties. See Edward
Luttwak, “Post-Heroic Armies,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 1996, p.
33.
24. Walter J. Boyne, Beyond the Wild Blue: A History of the Air Force
1947-1997, 1997, p. 7.
25. Ibid.
26. There are at least six categories of PGMs: 1) “man-in-the-loop”
weapons such as laser-guided bombs which require an operator to
“illuminate” the target or weapons that have on-board sensors which
allow an operator to guide the weapon to the target; 2) autonomous
weapons relying only on inertial navigation systems (INS) and
autonomous weapons updated by Global Positioning Satellites (GPS)
for guidance to the target; 3) autonomous weapons with terrain-aided
INS/GPS systems; 4) autonomous weapons with INS/GPS systems and
template matching algorithms for guidance; 5) anti-emitter PGMs that
rely on onboard systems to home on emitting targets such as enemy
radars; and 6) PGMs with “smart” submunitions that use various
sensors to guide themselves to targets. See John Birkler et al., A
Framework for Precision Conventional Strike in Post-Cold War Military
Strategy, Rand Corporation, 1996, pp. 6-11.
27. JV 2010, supra note 16, p. 21.
28. Benjamin S, Lambeth argues: 
[P]ossibly the single greatest impact of the technology
revolution on airpower and its effectiveness relative to other
force components is its capacity to save lives through the use of
precision attack to minimize noncombatant and friendly
fatalities by the substitution of technology for manpower and
the creation of battlefield conditions in which land elements,
once unleashed, can more readily do their jobs because of the
degraded capabilities of enemy forces.
Benjamin S, Lambeth, “Technology and Air War,” Air Force Magazine,
November 1996, pp. 50, 53. See also Lieutenant Colonel Edward Mann,
“One Target, One Bomb,” Military Review, September 1993, p. 33;
contra see Sean D. Naylor, “General: Technology is No Substitute for
38
Troops,” Air Force Times, March 3, 1997, p. 26, citing remarks by
General John Sheehan, USMC, then Commander-in Chief of U.S.
Atlantic Command.
29. Military necessity may be defined as follows:
Military necessity is the principle which justifies measures of
regulated force not forbidden by international law which are
indispensable for securing the prompt submission of the
enemy, with the least possible expenditure of economic and
human resources. . . . The principle of military necessity is not
the 19th Century German doctrine, Kriegsraison, asserting
that military necessity could justify any measures—even
violations of the laws of war—when the necessities of the
situation purportedly justified it.
Department of the Air Force Pamphlet 110-31, International Law—The
Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations, November 19, 1976,
para. 1-3a(1) [Hereinafter referred to as AFP 110-31].
30. David R. Markow, “The Russians and Their Nukes,” Air Force
Magazine, February 1997, p. 41.
31. Colonel James P. Terry, USMC, “Operation Desert Storm: Stark
Contrasts in Compliance with the Rule of Law,” No. 41 Naval L. Rev.,
No. 83, 1993, pp. 92-94. More than 600 wells were fired.
32. Michael N. Schmitt, “Green War: An Assessment of the
Environmental Law of International Armed Conflict,” No. 22, Yale J. of
Int’l L., No. 1, 1997, p. 21. Schmitt concludes that, in any event, “the
damage inflicted so outweighed possible gains the acts were wrongful
under international law.” Ibid.
33. See, also, Adam Roberts, “Environmental Issues in Inter-
national Armed Conflict: The Experience of the 1991 Gulf War,” in
International Law Studies 1996: Protection of the Environment During
Armed Conflict , 1996, pp. 222, 248. [“As to the burning of the oil wells,
there is no evidence that Iraq actually intended to achieve a military
effect by this means. However, the huge smoke clouds caused by the
fires, and poor weather during the last week of the war, did significantly
impede air operations over Kuwait, including reconnaissance and
ground attack”].
34. See Michael Gordon and Bernard E, Trainor, The Generals’ War,
1995, p. 364.
39
35. Ibid., pp. 363-371.
36. However, the Hague Convention IV, 1907 provides that “the
right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not
unlimited.”
37. See Gordon and Trainor, supra note 34, pp. 324-326.
38. AFP 110-31, supra note 29, provides as follows:
The term noncombatant includes a wide variety of disparate
persons . . . civilians, who are not otherwise lawful or unlawful
combatants, combatants who are hors de combat, PWs and
wounded and sick, members of the armed forces enjoying special 
status, chaplains and medics, and civilians accompanying the
armed forces.
Ibid., para. 3-4.
39. JV 2010, supra note 16, pp. 28, 34.
40. See Lieutenant Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, “Don’t Look Back,
They’re Not Behind You,” The Marine Corps Gazette, May 1996, pp.
72-73, discussing the military implications of chaining hostages to
targets. Hostage taking was not clearly prohibited until after World
War II. See H. Wayne Elliot, Lieutenant Colonel, USA, Ret., “Hostages
or Prisoners of War: War Crimes at Dinner,” No. 149, Mil. L. Rev., No.
241, Summer 1995.
41. See Stephen Erlanger, “Russia Allows Rebels to Leave with
Hostages,” New York Times, June 20, 1995, p. 1.
42. See “Libyans to Form Shield at Suspected Arms Plant,”
Baltimore Sun, May 17, 1996, p. 14.
43. See Barbara Slavin, “Iraq Leaves U.S. Few Options,” USA
Today, November 14, 1997, p. 13A.
44. James F. Dunnigan, Digital Soldiers: The Evolution of
High-Tech Weaponry and Tomorrow’s Brave New Battlefield, 1996, p.
219.
45. See “Ties that Bind,” The Economist, June 10, 1995, p. 19,
discussing the need for irregular armies to disperse in the face of
information-superior opponents and noting that dispersed forces “pose
problems” for “high-flying observations systems.”
40
46. See note 83, supra, and accompanying text.
47. See Earl H. Tilford, Jr., Halt Phase Strategy: Old Wine in New
Skins . . . With Powerpoint, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies
Institute, July 23, 1998, p. 26.
48. W. Hays Parks, “Air War and the Law of War,” No. 32, A.F. L.
Rev., No. 1, 1990, p. 168.
49. See Danielle L. Infield, “Precision-Guided Munitions
Demonstrated Their Pinpoint Accuracy in Desert Storm; But is a
Country Obligated to Use Precision Technology to Minimize Collateral
Civilian Injury and Damage?,” No. 26, Geo. Wash. J. Int’l L. & Econ.,  pp. 
109, 110-111, note, 1992.
50. “It appears that in a number of technological fields, e.g.,
micro-electronics and software engineering, the civilian sector has
already become more advanced than the military one . . . .” See Lev S.
Voronkov, John Grin, and Wim A. Smit, “Some Conclusions on Future
Studies and Policies,” in Military Technological Innovation and
Stability in a Changing World, No. 287, Voronkov, Grin, and Smit, eds.,
1992.
51. Daniel Kuehl, “The Ethics of Information Warfare and
Statecraft,” paper presented at InfoWARcon 96, Washington, DC,
September 1996, on file with author.
52. However, the dual-use of facilities does occur in other areas. See
Matthew L. Wald, “U.S. to Put Civilian Reactor to Military Use,” New
York Times, August 11, 1997, pp. 20.
53. John T. Correll, “Warfare in the Information Age,” Air Force
Magazine, December 1996, p. 3.
54. See Commander James W. Crawford, “The Law of Noncom-
batant Immunity and the Targeting of National Electrical Power
Systems,” No. 21, Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, No. 101,
Summer/Fall 1997.
55. See Winn Schwartau, “The Ethics of Civil Defense and
Information Warfare,” Journal of the National Computer Security
Association, NCSA News, June 1997, pp. 15-17.
56. See Crawford, supra note 54, p. 114.
57. Essentially, the concept of proportionality requires commanders 
to refrain from attacks when it “may be expected to cause incidental loss
41
of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects or
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the direct
and concrete military advantage anticipated.” See AFP 110-31, supra,
note 29, at para. 5-3c(1)(b)(I)(c).
58. The system uses terms that have specific definitions, and this
affects the evaluation. For example, “casualties” are defined as the
“estimated number of people who die or receive injuries that require
medical treatment and die due to short term effects, 6 months of nuclear
detonations.” “Population At Risk” is defined as the “total civilian
population in danger of dying, independent of shelter, from short term, 6 
months effects of nuclear detonations.” See Memorandum,
Acronyms/Definitions Used in SIOP Analysis, U, USSTRATCOM Plans 
and Policy Directorate, Force Assessment Branch, April 1997, on file
with author.
59. See AFP 110-31, supra note 29, at para. 5-3c(1)(b)(I)(c).
60. See D.M. Giangreco, “Casualty Projections for the U.S.
Invasions of Japan, 1945-1946: Planning and Policy Implications,” The
Journal of Military History, July 1997, p. 521; and Ralph Capio, “FDR
and Truman: Continuity and Context in the A-Bomb Decision,”
Airpower Journal, Fall 1995, p. 56.
61. See, generally, Paul R. Camacho, “Further Development in the
Construction of Political Action Expert Systems Software: Fuzzy Logic
Techniques on Social Science Variables,” a presentation for the Biennial 
International Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed
Forces and Society, Baltimore, MD, October 24-26, 1997, unpublished
paper on file with author.
62. “War is typically nonlinear, meaning the smallest effects can
have unpredicted, disproportionate consequences.” See Jeffrey
McKitrick, James Blackwell, Fred Littlepage, George Kraus, Richard
Blanchfield and Dale Hill, “Revolution in Military Affairs,” in
Battlefield of the Future, Air University, 1995. See also Glenn E. James,
“Chaos Theory: The Essentials for Military Applications 57-95,”
Newport Paper No. 10, Naval War College, 1996, discussing the
limitations of computer modeling.
63. Ellithorpe, supra, note 14, p. 4, “History has demonstrated the
fatal error of military decisions based on the use of scientific and
technical analysis at the expense of understanding the warfighting art.”
64. The GAO found that 45 percent of military personnel performed
support functions that could be done by civilians for an average of
42
$15,000 less. See Tom Bowman, “Drift Military Support Jobs to
Civilians, Close Inefficient Facilities, GAO Urges,” Baltimore Sun, April 
5, 1997, pp. 4.
65. Katherine M. Peters, “Civilians At War,” Government Executive,
July 1996, p. 23.
66. David Silverberg, “Crossing Computing’s Cultural Chasm,
Armed Forces Journal International, February 1997, pp. 38-39.
67. AFP 110-31, supra note 29, at para. 3-5.
68. Parks, supra note 48.
69. Ibid., at para. 3-3.
70. Paul Kennedy and George J. Andreopoulos, “The Laws of War:
Some Concluding Reflections,” in The Laws of War: Constraints on
Warfare in the Western World, No. 215, Michael Howard, George J.
Andreopoulos, and Mark L. Shulman, eds., 1994.
71. See Bryan Bender, “Defense Contractors Quickly Becoming
Surrogate Warriors,” Defense Daily, March 28, 1997, p. 490.
72. United States Air Force, “Global Engagement: A Vision for the
21st Century,” Air Force, 1997, p. 7.
73. Ibid., p. 19.
74. AFP 110-31, supra note 29, para. 3-3 provides:
An unlawful combatant is an individual who is not authorized
to take a direct part in hostilities but does. The term is
frequently used also to refer to otherwise privileged combat-
ants who do not comply with requirements of mode of dress, or
noncombatants in the armed forces who improperly use their
protected status as a shield to engage in hostilities. . . .
Unlawful combatants are a proper object of attack while
engaging as combatants. . . . If captured, they may be tried and
punished.
Ibid., See also Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Gehring, “Loss of Civilian
Protections Under the Fourth Geneva Convention and Protocol I,” No.
90, Mil. L. Rev., No. 49, 1980.
43
75. “Unlawful combatants” are not ordinarily considered “war
criminals.” Rather, they would be subject to prosecution under the
domestic law of capturing belligerent, much as out-of-uniform saboteurs 
would be. During World War II, for example, the United States captured 
eight German saboteurs and executed six. See American Heritage New
History of World War II, No. 276, revised and updated by Stephen E.
Ambrose based on the original text by C. L. Sulzberger, 1997.
76. See Stephen Bryen, “New Era of Warfare Demands Technology
Reserve Force,” Defense News, March 17-23, 1997, p. 27; and Brig Gen
Bruce M. Lawlor, ARNG, “Information Corps,” Armed Forces Journal
International, January 1998, pp. 26, 28.
77. Lou Marano, “Perils of Privatization,” Washington Post, May 27,
1997, p. 15.
78. Ibid.
79. Lawlor, supra note 76.
80. Ibid.
81. As quoted in Richard Holmes, Acts of War: The Behavior of Men
in Combat, 1985, p. 31.
82. Ibid.
83. A PGM is, on the average, fifteen times more expensive than an
unguided bomb. See Dunnigan, supra note 44, p. 135.
84. See Infield, supra note 49, pp. 140-141.
85. Ibid., p. 131.
86. See note 5, supra.
87. Iraq enjoyed some success in characterizing itself as a victim
using similar logic. See William M. Arkin, “Baghdad: The Urban
Sanctuary in Desert Storm?,” Airpower Journal, Spring 1997, pp. 4, 17.
88. Existing international agreements contain a de Martens Clause
which addresses new methods and means of warfare. It states:
[I]n cases not included in the regulations adopted by them, the
inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection
and rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result
44
from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the
laws of humanity, and dictates of the public conscience.
Preamble, 1907 Hague Convention, (IV) Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land. Accord, common article 63/62/142/158 of the
Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949; article 1(2) of the Protocol I
Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949; and, the
Preamble to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use
of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be
Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects.
89. As quoted by David Shukman, Tomorrow’s War: The Threat of
High-Technology Weapons, No. 233, 1996.
90. However, it must be recognized that generally LOAC does not
attempt to apportion responsibility in the context of jus in bello.
91. Daniel J. Boorstin, “Myths of Popular Innocence,” U.S. News &
World Report, March 4, 1991, p. 41.
92. Boorstin cites as examples the downfall of the Shah of Iran and
the liberation of Eastern Europe from Soviet rule. Ibid.
93. John Tierney, “Our Oldest Computer, Upgraded,” New York
Times Magazine, September 28, 1997, p. 46.
94. Captain John W. Bodnar, USNR, “The Military Technical
Revolution,” Naval War College Review, Summer 1993, p. 20.
95. For a brief, even-handed analysis of the current literature
regarding the democratic peace thesis, see Anne-Marie Smith,
Advances in Understanding International Peacekeeping, U.S. Institute
of Peace, 1998, pp. 30-34.
96. Ibid.; and Thomas Carothers, “Think Again: Democracy,”
Foreign Policy, Summer 1997, pp. 11, 14.
97. See generally, John Keegan, The History of Warfare, 1993.
98. Huntington’s original thesis, first published in 1993, together
with thoughtful critiques have been published. See Council on Foreign
Relations, The Clash of Civilizations? The Debate, 1996.
99. Henry Kissinger, “Limits to What U.S. Can Do in Bosnia,”
Washington Post, September 22, 1997, p. 19.
45
100. Edward L. Rowney, a former U.S. arms control negotiator,
comments:
Our biggest mistakes stem from the assumption that others are
like us, when in fact, they are more unlike than like us. We insist 
on ascribing to others our cultural traits, not recognizing that
we have different objectives due to our unique historic
backgrounds and sets of values. In short, “We fail to place
ourselves in the other person’s moccasins.”
Edward L. Rowney, “Tough Times, Tougher Talk,” American Legion
Magazine, May 1997, pp. 24-26.
101. James W. Child, Nuclear War: The Moral Dimension, 1986, pp.
171-172.
102. Boorstin, supra note 91.
103. As quoted by Peter Grier, “Information Warfare,” Air Force
Magazine, March 1995, p. 35.
104. See Dennis Brack, “Do Photos Lie?,” Proceedings, August 1996,
p. 47.
105. The White House, A National Security Strategy for a New
Century, No. 19, May 1997.
106. Sidney Axinn, contends:
[What is] the morality of psychological warfare? When it is an
effort to use the truth to gain a military goal, this type of warfare 
is to be accepted and applauded. When lying or “disinformation”
is used, it cannot be accepted as an honorable weapon. Of
course, this is quite apart from legitimate tactics to conceal
information from an enemy or to mystify or fool an enemy.
See Sidney Axinn, A Moral Military, 1989, pp. 159-160.
107. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 2d ed., 1992, p. xvii,
emphasis added.
108. See generally, Eviathar H. Ben-Zedeff, “Achilles’ Heel:
Feasibility of Military Censorship of the News Media in the ‘Third Wave’ 
Era of Technology,” a presentation for the Biennial International
Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and
46
Society, Baltimore, MD, October 24-26, 1997, unpublished paper on file
with author.
109. Douglas Waller, a Time Magazine correspondent observes:
The same technology that is revolutionizing the way the
Pentagon fights wars is also changing the way the media cover
them. The media can now provide viewers, listeners and even
readers almost instant access to a battlefield. With lighter
video cameras, smaller portable computers, cellular phones,
their own aircraft, and worldwide electronic linkups, the
media can report on any battlefield no matter how remote and
no matter how many restrictions the Defense Department
tries to place on coverage.
Douglas Waller, “Public Affairs, the Media, and War in the Information
Age,” a presentation for the War in the Information Age Conference,
Tufts University, November 15-16, 1995, unpublished paper on file with 
author.
110. See William J. Broad, “Private Ventures Hope for Profits on
Spy Satellites,” New York Times, February 10, 1997, p. 1.
111. Compare Bill Gertz, “Spies Use Internet to Build Files on U.S.,”
Washington Times, January 3, 1997, p. 5.
112. Compare Eliot Cohen, “What to Do About National Defense,”
Commentary, November 1994, pp. 21, 31. “Far more worrisome,
however, is the possibility that a military fighting the shadowy battles
of ‘information warfare’ might find itself engaging the country in
foreign-policy tangles of a particularly messy kind.”
113. See George C. Wilson, “Like It or Not, Space Warfare is Way of
Future—and Past,” Air Force Times, June 28, 1994, p. 70.
114. See generally, Myron Hura and Gary McCleod, Intelligence
Support and Mission Planning for Autonomous Precision-Guided
Weapons, Rand Corporation, 1992.
115. See Jennifer Heroema, “A.F. Space Chief Calls War in Space
Inevitable,” Space News, August 1-18, 1996, p. 4.
116. See William Broad, “Military Hoping to Test-Fire Laser
Against Satellite,” New York Times, September 1, 1997, p. 1.
47
117. W. Hays Parks, “Air War and the Law of War,” No. 32, A.F. L.
Rev., pp. 1, 168, 1990.
118. William H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power, 1982, p. 369. This is
also true with respect to much of the actual technology aboard the
spacecraft. See Craig Covault, “NRO Radar, Sigint Launches Readied,”
Aviation Week & Space Technology, September 1, 1997, p. 22. “The same 
technology employed by [the military satellites] will increasingly be
applied to the commercial sector.”
119. See U.S. Space Command, Guardians of the High Frontier, No.
16, 1996, describing military satellite systems.
120. See notes 52 and 53, supra, and accompanying text.
121. Jeffrey R. Barnett, Future War: An Assessment of Aerospace
Campaigns in 2010, 1996, p. xix.
122. Essentially, the concept of proportionality requires
commanders to refrain from attacks when it “may be expected to cause
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian
objects or combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to
the direct and concrete military advantage anticipated.” See AFP
110-31, supra note 29, at paragraph 5-3c(1)(b)(I)(c).
123. See U.S. Space Command Vision for 2020, 1997, p. 6.
124. See, for example, Article I, “Treaty on Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Explorations and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,” January 27, 1967, 18
U.S.T. 2411, I.I.A.S. 6347; 610 U.N.T.S. 205, the “Outer Space Treaty.”
See, generally, Richard A. Morgan, “Military Uses of Commercial
Communications Satellites: A New Look at the Outer Space Treaty and
‘Peaceful Purposes’,” No. 60, J. Air L. & Comm., No. 237, Fall 1994.
125. Morgan, Ibid. See also Naval War College, Department of
Oceans Law and Policy, Annotated Supplement to the Commander’s
Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, para. 2.9.2, note 114, 1997.
126. Among the problems with declaring space as an area of
operations is the fact that there is no universally accepted definition of
exactly where national sovereignty ends and “space” begins. See AFP
110-31, supra note 14, at para. 2-1h.
127. See Jonathan S. Landay, “The Next Arms Race? Drawing
Battle Lines in Space?,” Christian Science Monitor, December 17, 1997,
pp. 1.
48
128. See, for example, Hague Convention Respecting the Rights and
Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in the Case of War on Land, 1907.
Communications facilities on neutral territory are inviolate from attack
so long as they are made available to all belligerents.
129. See Michael R. Mantz, The New Sword: A Theory of Space
Combat Power, Air University Press, May 1995, p. 12, emphasis added.
130. National Science and Technology Council, National Space
Policy, White House Press Release, September 19, 1996, pp. 6.
131. See, for example, Ben Bova, “Laser Foes Forget Crossbow’s
History,” USA Today, January 7, 1998, p. 15.
132. See, generally, Commander James N. Bond, USN, Peacetime
Data Manipulation as One Aspect of Offensive Information Warfare:
Questions of Legality under the United Nations Charter Article 2(4),
Advanced Research Project, Naval War College, June 14, 1996,
unpublished manuscript.
133. See Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., “Cyberattack! Are We At War?”
Journal of the National Computer Security Association, NCSA News,
November 1996, p. 19.
134. Bond, supra note 132.
135. See, generally, Joseph W. Cook III, Maura F. McGowan, and
David P. Fiely, “Non-Lethal Weapons Technologies, Legalities, and
Potential Policies,” No. 5, USAFA J. of Legal Studies, 1994/1995, pp. 23,
38.
136. Larry Lynn, Director, U.S. Department of Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency, says that “there is no such thing as nonlethal
of course.” See “One on One,” Defense News, February 19-25, 1996, p\p.
30. 
137. See Cook, et al., note 135, pp. 28-35.
138. See also Thomas E. Ricks, “Gingrich’s Futuristic Vision for
Re-Shaping the Armed Forces Worry Military Professionals,” Wall
Street Journal, February 8, 1995, pp. 16, contending that “many of the
supporters of the military who lack firsthand experience . . . believe that
gadgets can somehow substitute for the blood and sweat of ground
combat.”
49
139. See Lieutenant General Anthony Zinni, “No Premium on
Killing,” Proceedings, December 1996, pp. 26-28, arguing that nonlethal 
means should be used in tandem with lethal means.
140. A. J. Bacevich and Lawrence F. Kaplan, “The Clinton
Doctrine,” The Weekly Standard, September 30, 1996, pp. 16, 20.
141. Parks, supra note 48, p. 142.
142. See Best, supra note 21, pp. 274-275.
143. H. R. McMaster discusses a similar theme in the context of the
Vietnam War in his book, Dereliction of Duty, 1997:
Graduated pressure was fundamentally flawed . . . The strategy
ignored the uncertainty of war and the unpredictable psychology 
of an activity that involves killing, death, and destruction. To the 
North Vietnamese, military action, involving as it did attacks on 
their forces and bombing their territory, was not simply a means 
of communication. Human sacrifice in war evokes strong
emotions creating a dynamic that defies systems analysis
quantification.
Ibid., p. 327, emphasis added.
144. A. J. Bacevich and Lawrence F. Kaplan, supra note 140, pp.
20-21.
145. JV 2010, supra note 16, p. 18.
146. Compare, George I. Seffers, “U.S. Army Puts Tactical Internet
to Test,” Defense News, March 17-23, 1997, p. 3, describing a battlefield
information/communication system currently being tested.
147. See Captain Michael R. Lwin, USA, and Captain Mark R. Lwin, 
USMC, “The Future of Land Power,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,
September 1997, pp. 82-83.
148. David S. Alberts, The Unintended Consequences of Information 
Age Technologies, No. 36, National Defense University, 1996.
149. U.S. v. Calley, 46 C.M.R. 1131, C.M.A. 1973.
150. Stephen E. Ambrose, Americans At War, 1997, pp. 152.




154. David A. Fulgham, “Computer Combat Rules Frustrate the
Pentagon,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, September 15, 1997, p.
67.
155. Ibid.
156. See Pat Cooper and Frank Oliveri, “Air Force Carves
Operational Edge In Info Warfare,” Defense News, August 21-27, 1995.
157. See, for example, “Generals to Moms: At Ease!,” Omaha
World-Herald, February 16, 1996, p. 6, discussing Israeli recruits
arriving for training with personal cellular phones and using them to
call their mothers to complain about various aspects of their military
duties; and Lisa Hoffman, “E-Mail will link troops to families,”
European Stars and Stripes, December 18, 1995, p. 7.
158. As quoted in Nicholas Wade, “Bytes Make Might,” New York
Times Magazine, March 12, 1995, p. 28.
159. See, for example, Brigid Schulte, “How a Fighter Pilot’s Raw
Account of Rescue Flashed Around the Globe,” Philadelphia Inquirer,
July 11, 1995, describing how a private e-mail allegedly contains
“explicit descriptions of radio frequencies, pilot code names, exact times
and weapons load for the mission” relating to the rescue of U.S. pilot
Scott O’Grady in the Balkans became available to millions on the
Internet.
160. See Wade, supra note 158. Ibid.
161. John Leo, “Gadgetry’s Power and Peril,” U.S. News & World
Report, April 15, 1991, pp. 20.
162. See discussion on pages 18 and 19 supra.
163. Martin Van Creveld, “Technology and World War II,” in The
Oxford Illustrated History of Modern War, No. 304, Charles Townsend,
ed., 1997, emphasis in original.
164. Ronald Haycock and Keith Neilson, Men, Machines, and War,
1988, p. xi.
165. Ibid., pp. xii. 
51
166. See Shukman, supra note 89, pp. 8. See also Michael Loescher,
“New Approaches to DoD Information-Systems Acquisition” in
Cyberwar: Security, Strategy and Conflict in the Information Age, Alan
D. Campen, et. al., ed., 1996, p. 127, “In a world in which state-of-the-art
is off-the-shelf, industry, and potentially our foes, can obtain better
information systems (IS) technology cheaper and faster than DoD
because our current acquisition system buys computers in the same way 
we buy bullets.”; and Jeffery R. Barnett, Future War, 1996, p. 17,
stressing the need to compress the procurement time for information
technologies.
167. See, for example, “The Software Revolution; The Information
Advantage,” The Economist, June 10, 1995, p. 11, discussing how
information technology will allow a combatant to get through the
observation, orientation, decision, and action [OODA] loop faster and
thus maintain the initiative.
168. See also Arsenio T. Gumahad II, “The Profession of Arms in the
Information Age,” Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 1997, pp. 14-15.
“Consideration of moral and legal issues raised by information warfare
has not advanced as quickly as technology and doctrine.” 
169. Stefan Possony and Jerry Pournelle, The Strategy of
Technology, 1970, p. xxxi, as quoted in Chris Hables Gray, Postmodern
War, 1997, p. 172.
52
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE





Colonel Larry M. Wortzel
Acting Director of Research
Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.
Author
Colonel Charles J. Dunlap, Jr.
Director of Publications and Production
Ms. Marianne P. Cowling
Publications Assistant
Ms. Rita A. Rummel
*****
Composition
Mrs. Rita E. Burgett
Cover Artist
Mr. James E. Kistler
